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LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO FIGHT SURFACE WATER:
THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMON ENEMY
DOCTRINE IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
Draining and disposing of surface water' often leads to one
landowner surrendering the use and enjoyment of his land as a result
of another protecting the use and enjoyment of his land.2 Questions
of liability for damages caused by the diversion of surface water are
governed by three distinct doctrines.' The three rules, developed in
the early nineteenth century, 4 are the civil law rule, the common
enemy rule, and the reasonable use rule. The civil law rule states
that a landowner who interferes with the natural flow of surface
waters is liable for any injury to other landowners.' The common
enemy rule states that each landowner has an unlimited right to fight
surface water as he sees fit, without liability for the harm he may
cause others! Pursuant to the rule of reasonable use, a landowner
is liable when he interferes with the flow of surface water only if
his actions are unreasonable.7 These rules control which landowner
ultimately bears the cost of any damages sustained in ridding the land
of surface water.
Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court in Argyelan v. Haviland8
chose to "expressly disapprove" the application of the rule of
reasonable use9 and re-affirm the common enemy doctrine as the law
governing surface water. The rationale upon which the court based
1. A commonly accepted definition of surface water in Indiana refers to water
from "falling rains or melting snows which is diffused over the surface of the ground
or which temporarily flows upon or over the surface as the natural elevations and
depressions of the land may guide it but which has no definite banks or channel."
Kramer v. Roger, __ Ind. App. - - 441 N.E.2d 700, 707 (1982).
2. Kinyon and McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV.
891 (1940).
3. For a discussion regarding the three rules and their subsequent modifica-
tions see Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193 (1979).
4. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 895, 899, and 905.
5. The civil law rule is documented as commencing in Orleans Navigation
Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Martin 214 (La. 1812) and Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1848).
6. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 898-99. The first case to adopt the
common enemy rule was Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. 171 (1851).
7. The reasonable use rule was first adopted in Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439
(1870).
8. - Ind. - 435 N.E.2d 973 (1982).
9. Id. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 978.
10. Id. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 976.
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its conclusion is illusory" and, as pointed out by Justice Hunter in
his dissenting opinion, offensive to our system of jurisprudence.12 The
use of the common enemy doctrine, which remains as that originally
set forth in 1878,"3 is a harsh rule requiring no balancing of interests
and frequently leading to unjust results. The single modification to
the rule, which states that a landowner has no right to collect sur-
face water in a channel and cast it in a body upon another's land,"
is rendered virtually meaningless by the court in Argyelan,15 leaving
the status of the law in Indiana truly archaic in form."
This note will demonstrate, through analysis of both Indiana
precedent and the present position taken by the Indiana Supreme
Court, the need to denounce the common enemy rule. The inherent
injustice of the court's decision in Argyelan mandates re-examination
of surface water law by either the judiciary or the legislature. To
11. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
12. Argyelan, - Ind. at - 435 N.E.2d at 978.
13. The court cites Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167, 173 (1878), as reflecting the
current status of the law in Indiana. The common enemy doctrine is stated as follows:
The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it in such manner
and for such purposes as he may see fit, either by changing the surface
or the erection of buildings or other structures thereon, is not restricted
or modified by the fact that his own land is so situated with reference
to that of adjoining owner that an alteration in the mode of its improve-
ment or occupation in any portion of it will cause water, which may
accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling on its surface, or flowing
onto it over the surface of adjacent lots, either to stand in unusual quan-
tities on other adjacent lands, or pass into or over the same in greater
quantities or in other directions than they were accustomed to flow. The
obstruction of surface water or an alteration in the flow of it affords no
cause of action in behalf of a person who may suffer loss or detriment
therefrom against one who does not act inconsistent with the due exer-
cise of dominion over his own soil.
Id. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 976-77.
14. Weis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241, 247 (1881).
15. __ Ind. , 435 N.E.2d 973. In Connor v. Woodfill, 126 Ind. 85, 87,
25 N.E. 876, 877 (1890), the court held that the appellees were trespassing whenever
they shed water, through downspouts from their own building so as to throw it upon
appellant's lot. The court in Argyetan held that if the water entered the adjacent prop-
erty "diffused to a general flow" there is no liability. __ Ind. at _ 435 N.E.2d
at 976. Therefore, one may collect water in an artificial channel and cast it upon another
so long as the water is "diffused" before reaching the adjacent property. The court
in distinguishing the "character" of the flow as being determinative of liability, rendered
their own modification meaningless: A primary purpose of the collection and discharge
modification is to avoid flooding due to downspouts, yet after Argyelan, one need only
build a small curb to disperse the water before it flows onto and damages adjacent
property. Id. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 976.
16. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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lay a proper foundation for this conclusion, it is necessary to briefly
discuss and evaluate the three rules governing surface water disputes.
The history of surface water law in Indiana is traced to establish the
foundation upon which it was formed and the policies prevalent at
the time. Analysis of three recent Indiana decisions demonstrates the
necessity for a current and adaptable standard by which surface water
disputes may be equitably resolved. Examination of surrounding
jurisdictions also illustrates that Indiana should re-examine its con-
tinued application of the common enemy doctrine in light of current
trends in land development. Finally, the note will recommend adop-
tion of those alternatives best suited to meet the demands of a
changing society.
PRINCIPLE RULES GOVERNING SURFACE WATER DISPUTES
There are predominately three rules governing surface water law
in the United States. From these rules, various recognized modifica-
tions have evolved."8 It is from these rules and their subsequent
modifications that viable alternatives to surface water disputes are
derived. Application of the rules and their modifications to the
hypothetical situation which follows will lay the necessary foundation
for discussion of subsequent issues. The effects of each rule on the
rights of property owners differ and a review of these differences
will aid in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the
rules and their modification.
Fred Farmer purchased a lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot F)
in 1950 for agricultural purposes. Lot F is located on the outskirts
of a rural community, and is situated so as to naturally drain surface
water due south onto the adjoining, lower lots. Two lots lie due south
of Lot F and are directly affected by the drainage. These two lots
(hereinafter referred to as Lot C and Lot R) are level with each other,
yet lower than Lot F. In 1960, Ron Resident purchased Lot R and
built his home upon it. In 1970, Con Commercial purchased Lot C,
lying directly between Lot F and Lot R. Due to the continuing
expansion of the nearby community, Con was granted a permit to
construct a commercial building on Lot C. Con then proceeded to raise
the level of his lot with fill dirt, pave the entire surface, and con-
17. For a general discussion of the rules and jurisdiction utilizing each see
generally Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193 (1979).
18. For a discussion of the various modifications, see generally Annot. 93
A.L.R.3d 1193 (1979); Maloney and Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?,
8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 72 (1968); Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2.
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struct upon his lot a private business, having a "gradual slope"
downward, due south so as to drain onto Lot R.11
Fred Farmer could not use sections of his property for
agricultural purposes until the surface water was drained from it.
After being elevated to a higher level, Lot C impeded the drainage
of water from Lot F and deterred Fred's efforts to farm. Addition-
ally, Ron Resident experienced flooding in his basement and yard after
Con altered the surface of his lot since Lot C increased the amount
of surface water draining onto Lot R and Ron could not afford to
develop a means of obstructing the extra water. Meanwhile Con, re-
taining both the use and enjoyment of his property, prospered from
his commercial enterprise. In times of rain and snow, surface water
disputes inevitably arise between the owners of the three lots. The
outcome of these disputes is determined by the specific surface water
rule applied. An application of the various rules to this hypothetical
illustrates the effect of each doctrine on the rights and liabilities of
the property owners involved.
Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule finds its origin in the maxim, aqua currit et
debet currere, ut solebat es juie naturae." In its purest form, the rule
makes any diversion of surface water from its natural flow a tortious
act. Therefore, if strictly construed, the civil law rule makes mere
plowing of Lot F an illegal diversion of surface water. Clearly, strict
application of the civil law rule will impede both the physical and
economic development of Lot F. However, in actual application, the
civil law rule subjects Fred Farmer to liability for interference with
the natural flow of water if it causes an invasion of another's interest
in the use and enjoyment of his land. 1 There is, in effect, a servitude
between Lots F and C: Con must accept the surface water which
naturally drains onto his land, and Fred can do nothing to change
19. This hypothetical situation was created to aid in explaining the types of
situations arising in surface water disputes. Of primary concern here are the basic
inequities resulting from the application of an inflexible rule, particularly in light of
expanding urbanization. Although the probability of encountering three adjoining lots
of this nature, agricultural, commercial, and residential is slight, the individual prob-
lems discussed in the hypothetical do occur frequently. Furthermore, the portion of
the hypothetical dealing with Lots C and R is very similar to the fact situation of
Argyelan, - Ind. at - 435 N.E.2d at 974-75.
20. "Water runs and should run, as it is wont to do by natural right." Kauff-
man v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 413 (1856).
21. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 893.
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the natural flow of water from his land.' Also, under rigid applica-
tion of this rule, Lot C cannot be elevated so as to turn waters back
onto Lot F, and Fred is liable for any interference with the natural
flow of water onto Lot C. Assuming Lot C naturally drains onto Lot
R, application of the civil law rule will preclude Con from altering
the surface of his property, while Ron is forced to accept any natural
surface water runoff from Lot C. Consequently, owners of the higher,
or dominant estate are limited in development, while owners of the
lower, or servient estate are required to tolerate surface water
drainage."
To facilitate development and avoid the inequities imposed upon
landowners by the civil law rule, a reasonable use modification to the
rule has been developed. 4 Imposition of liability upon the parties in-
volved is determined by the reasonableness of their conduct.
Therefore, if Fred plows Lot F and thereby alters the natural flow
of drainage to the detriment of Lot C, the court will determine liability
through a balancing of the relevant factors.25 If damage to Lot C is
minimal and Fred has no alternative method of disposal, a court will
probably find his conduct to be reasonable." Accordingly, Fred is not
prohibited from improving his land, though he must pay the economic
cost of this improvement.' If, on the other hand, the court finds Fred's
conduct to be unreasonable, resulting in material injury to Lot C, Fred
will be liable for damages. 8 The reasonable use modification to the
22. Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1207 (1979).
23. "Upper owner" and "lower owner" depends upon the elevation of the land
and the path of drainage. The upper owner connotes one who has higher property
and thereby a natural drainage downward onto another's land. When applying the
civil law rule, this is referred to as the dominant estate. The lower owner connotes
the owner upon whose property water drains. When applying the civil law rule, this
is referred to as the servient estate.
24. See generally Note, From Good Husbandry to Reasonable Use: Illinois Sur-
face Water Drainage Law Evolves in Subdivision Case, 52 CHI-KENT L. REV. 169, 170-73
(1975); Note, Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 688-90 (1968).
25. Factors weighed in ascertaining the reasonableness of a party's conduct
are: the gravity of the harm; the utility of the actor's conduct; the foreseeability of
the harm; and the motive of the actor. See Keys v Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 410, 412
P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273. 281 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 822-31
(1939).
26. Note, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L.
REV. 76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rules in Urban Areas].
27. Note that application of the reasonable use modification to the civil law
rule in the situation where Lot C drains naturally onto Lot R results in an equitable
result because under this analysis a residential owner is not forced to bear the cost
of another's private, commercial gain.
28. Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26, at 81.
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civil law rule is more flexible than the civil law rule as Fred is per-
mitted to improve his land while Con is not forced to pay for that
improvement through loss of the use and enjoyment of his own land.
Common Enemy Doctrine
While the civil law rule protects the right to natural drainage,
the common enemy doctrine promotes the right of each landowner
to fight surface water any way possible. The common enemy doctrine
is based on the concept of absolute ownership of property. This un-
mitigated respect for ownership rights in property originates in the
maxim cuJis est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. Predicated on the
theory that surface water is a nuisance,"0 this doctrine bestows upon
the owner of property an unconditional and unlimited right to dispose
of surface water on his property as he sees fit, despite any harm he
may thereby cause to another.3 A law based on the maxim that a
landowner may use his own land for any lawful purpose without due
regard for adjoining landowners may, as one might expect, lead to
unjust results.
Evaluating the effect on this doctrine on Ron, the residential
owner of the lot with the lowest elevation, demonstrates the poten-
tial inequities of the rule. Alterations to the surface of Lot C,
necessitated by its transformation to commercial property, are sanc-
tioned under the common enemy rule.2 Altering the natural surface
of Lot C will eliminate ground absorption and thereby increase the
flow of surface water onto Lot R. This is permitted even though the
increased flow may destroy Ron's ability to use and enjoy his
property.' Ron, on the other hand, acquires the unqualified right to
fight the surface water flowing onto his lot from Lot C. Therefore,
Con is encouraged to develop his property, and Ron is burdened with
29. "Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341
(5th ed. 1979).
30. Shaffer, Surface Water in Indiana, 39 IND. L. J. 69, 75 (1963).
31. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 898.
32. This attitude is reflected by the court's opinion in Argyelan, where the
court stated that "Under the common enemy doctrine, it is not unlawful to accelerate
or increase the flow of surface water by limiting or eliminating ground absorption
or changing the grade of the land." - Ind. at _ 435 N.E.2d at 976.
33. One rationale given for this seemingly unjust result is that owners of
lots in cities and towns purchase and retain their property with the manifest condi-
tion that natural or existing surface is likely to be altered by the progress of municipal
development. Comment, Real Property - Surface Waters - Property Owner Cannot
Discharge Surface Waters in Manner Injurious to Property to Neighbor, 24 NOTRE DAME
LAW 599 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Discharge Injurious to Neighbor].
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the surface water to the extent it cannot be diverted from his land.
Though the common enemy doctrine was originally adopted for the
purpose of encouraging development of land, ' harsh results led to
modifications of the rule.
Modifications of the common enemy doctrine fall within two major
categories' generally referred to as the "collection and discharge"
modification and the "due care" modification.' The collection and
discharge modifications restricts the reach of the common enemy rule
by denying a landowner the right to collect surface water by artificial
means and discharge it upon adjoining lands in large quantities or
in a concentrated flow.87 The modification does not apply if such
discharge is through a natural drainway.1 Therefore, Con Commer-
cial may not collect surface water in volume and discharge it in a
concentrated flow upon Lot R." However, Con may legally divert
water onto Lot R if it enters the property in a "diffused" state.0 Im-
position of liability is conditioned upon the manner in which the water
enters adjoining property and a technical interpretation of the
language used to define the limitation. Assessing liability under the
34. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 898-99, cite three reasons justifying
the initial adoption by courts of the common enemy rule. One reason is premised on
the notion that a landowner should be able to do as he pleases with his land. Other
courts adopted the rule because they were of the opinion that it represented English
"common law." Still others adopted it because they believed it to be consistent with
public policy favoring the improvement and development of land.
35. For a discussion of all the modifications see generally Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d
1193 (1979); Kinyon and McClure: supra note 2; Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra
note 26.
36. Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26, at 87.
37. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 913.
38. Surface water law and watercourse law are difficult to distinguish because
surface water loses its identify as such when it reaches a natural watercourse. Gwinn
v. Myers, 234 Ind. 560, 561-62, 129 N.E.2d 225, 226-27 (1955). Watercourse law is a
topic in itself and will be addressed only briefly throughout the text and footnotes
when it is necessary to clarify an issue involving surface water.
39. The major purpose for the modification, at least in an urban setting, is
to protect a landowner from one who uses sewers, gutters, or downspouts to collect
surface water and then discharges it in volume upon the land of another. This modifica-
tion does not impose liability for damming surface water or for a change in the course
or an increase in the flow of surface water which results in injury to another. Note,
Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26, at 85.
40. Indiana courts have interpreted the issue of liability as depending upon
the character of the flow as it enters adjoining property. Thus, if water is diffused
to a general flow at the point of entering the land, it is irrelevant that it was once
impounded or channeled. Argyelan, - Ind. at , 435 N.E.2d at 976. Diffused is
defined as meaning to pour out or spread freely; to spread thinly; to spread out over
the surface of the ground. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 315 (6th ed. 1979).
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due care modification, however, requires examination of entirely dif-
ferent criteria.
The imposition of liability under the due care modification
depends upon a finding by the court that a landowner is negligent
in making improvements on his land.' 1 Consequently, if Con uses
reasonable care to avoid unnecessary injury to Ron's property, he is
not subject to liability. Absent negligence on the part of Con,42 the
common enemy doctrine is applied and Ron must bear the cost of
the damage caused to his property by the improvements of Lot C.'"
Alternatively, if Ron is able to construct a viable impediment to dispel
the water draining from Lot C, he is then subject to the negligence
standard. It is apparent that the modifications mitigate the harshness
of the common enemy doctrine, but their protective function is
extremely limited by the policy of the underlying rule. As the com-
mon enemy doctrine is premised on a right to use property despite
the harm which may result to surrounding property, the benefit deriv-
ed from the modifications is limited.
Rule of Reasonable Use
Greater protection may be afforded to landowners involved in
surface water disputes by adoption of a rule which provides for review
of the totality of circumstances, in consideration of the natural rights
of all." Under the reasonable use rule, a landowner has the legal right
to make reasonable use of his land, even if the flow of surface water
is altered and causes certain harm to others.'" Liability is imposed,
however, when this diversion of surface water is unreasonably harm-
41. Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26, at 88.
42. In determining negligence, the courts usually do not consider the utility
of the actor's conduct and the gravity of the harm caused by such conduct. This is
the difference between the due care modification of the common enemy doctrine, and
the reasonable use modification to the common enemy doctrine. A majority of courts
utilizing the due care modification require a finding of good faith improvement of prop-
erty resulting in neither unnecessary nor needless injury to the adjoining landowner.
See generally Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 928-31 and the footnotes therein.
See also Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26, at 76.
43. A major disadvantage of modifications to either the civil law rule or com-
mon enemy rule is that when a particular act does not violate a modification, the
underlying rule is itself applied to the situation. Therefore, the basic themes of each
rule continue to affect the property rights of the parties involved.
44. If the rule of reasonable use were to be based on a property maxim, it
would be sic uture tuo it alienum non laedus; meaning, "Use your property in such
a manner as not to injury that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979).
45. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., - N.H. -, 120 A.2d 4, 59 A.L.R.2d 413
(1956).
[Vol. 18
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ful. The rule of reasonable use favors neither the upper landowner
nor the lower landowner. Rather than assigning specific rights or
privileges to a particular party, the question of liability is determin-
ed upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case
and in accordance with principles of "fairness and common sense. 48
Whether factors exist which justify shifting loss from the person harm-
ed to the one who causes the harm can be determined by application
of this rule to each individual case. The rule of reasonable use is
premised upon tort concepts, 47 and therefore is not easily distinguish-
ed from modifications evolving from the common enemy and civil law
rules. 8 Potential liability depends on the type of invasion involved.
Liability for an unintentional invasion is limited to conduct found to
be negligent or reckless, whereas liability for an intentional invasion
depends on whether the actors' conduct is unreasonable.4 1
In applying the rule of reasonable use to the hypothetical situa-
tion, it is possible that a court will view Con's invasion of Lot R as
an intentional act. The court will then consider whether the utility
of Con's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm it causes to Lot
46. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 905.
47. Courts following this rule generally adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
S 822-36 (1939).
48. It is often difficult to distinguish the rule of reasonable use from the
reasonable use modification of the civil law rule and the due care modification of the
common enemy rule. It may be helpful first to distinguish the due care modification
from the reasonable use modification. This distinction was stated ingeniously by Maloney
and Plager:
"The civil law owner may never drain his land except by following
the natural drainage, but the common enemy owner may always drain
his land except that he may not use artificial channels. The civil law owner
may never obstruct the natural flow of surface water unless he acts
reasonably, while the common enemy owner may always obstruct the flow
if he acts reasonably."
Maloney and Plager, supra note 18, at 79. The difference between the modifications
and reasonable use rule itself appears to be two-fold. First, when a modification is
applied and negligence is absent, the courts will apply the underlying rule, eg. either
the civil law rule or the common enemy rule. Idealistically, there is no application
of either rule when the rule of reasonable use is applied and the court finds neither
unreasonable conduct nor negligent conduct. Second, it is alleged that the modifica-
tions require malice or negligence, and therefore favor "foreseeability of harm," whereas
the rule of reasonable use, similar to the law of nuisance focuses on the results of
the action, eg. the consequent interference with another's use and enjoyment of his
land. See generally Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735, 93 A.L.R.3d 1183 (1975);
Note, Surface Water Flooding in Urban Areas: Rights and Remedies Under the Common-
Enemy Doctrine, 12 TULSA L.J. 574 (1977) [hereinafter cited Note, Flooding in Urban
Areas].
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 833, comment b at 146 (1939).
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R.5 Though a similar result may be reached by applying one of the
rules previously discussed, application of the rule of reasonable use
permits review of all relevant factors and thereby heightens the
probability of an equitable outcome. Though advocates of the com-
mon enemy and civil law rules condemn this rule because it reduces
predictability,51 its flexibility is justified in light of the rapid ad-
vancements in modern land development.
The common enemy, civil law, and reasonable use rules originated
at approximately the same time and by the mid 1800's, most states
found it necessary to select one rule to govern surface water disputes.'
This selection was limited primarily to either the common enemy or
the civil law rule.' Though the rule of reasonable use existed at this
time, it was not considered an acceptable alternative, and was adopted
by only New Hampshire.' Indiana was among those states which chose
to adopt the common enemy doctrine.' Since that time, however, the
rule of reasonable use has gained acceptance and notoriety among
both commentators and members of the judiciary, resulting in its adop-
tion in several jurisdictions." Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court
50. Here the court is allowed to weigh all relevant factors as they are set
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at S 827-28. Section 827 lists the gravity of harm
factors involved. The following factors are listed as important: (a) extent of the harm
involved; (b) character of the harm involved; (c) the social value which the law attaches
to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; (d) the suitability of the particular use or
enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the burden on the person
harmed of avoiding the harm. Section 828 lists the utility of conduct factors involved.
The following factors are listed as important: (a) the social value which the law at-
taches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to
the character of the locality; (c) whether it is impracticable to prevent or avoid the
invasion, if the activity is maintained; (d) whether it is impracticable to maintain the
activity if it is required to bear the cost of compensating for the invasion. Thus, the
courts will be more likely to reach the issue of whether or not it is equitable for
a residential owner to pay for commercial development from which he will derive no
benefit, and from which the developer has a substantial private interest.
51. Indicative of the argument is the following statement:
"If the true common law rule or the civil law rule were followed
it would do away with much litigation. Confusion comes when the courts
take the 'middle road' theory and try to settle each case on its own merits
and consequently leave the law in a state of confusion."
Comment, Common Law Rights as to Surface Waters, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW, 364, 366
(1946).
52. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 891.
53. Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1197 (1979).
54. Rindge v. Sargent, 64 N.H. 294, 9 A. 723 (1887).
55. Indiana expressly adopted the common enemy doctrine in Taylor, 64 Ind.
167.
56. See Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963);
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declined to adopt the rule of reasonable use, choosing instead to re-
affirm its decision to apply the common enemy doctrine to surface
water disputes. 5' This decision was based in large part upon the doc-
trine of stare decisis.
EFFECT OF STARE DECISIS ON INDIANA'S SURFACE WATER LAW
Stare Decisis stands for the principle that once a court has
developed a rule of law to be applied to a certain factual situation,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same.' It is imperative to evaluate past deci-
sions to determine: (1) what influenced the formation of law, (2) the
underlying policy and purpose of the law, and (3) whether the law
remains viable and beneficial in a modern society. 9 Evaluation of these
factors is necessary before a decision to depart from stare decisis can
be made.
Tracing the development of surface water law in Indiana reveals
weaknesses in the common enemy doctrine which become more
prevalent with current changes in policy and trends in land develop-
ment. Several factors are relevant to a discussion of the development
and ultimate adoption of the right to fight doctrine. Expansion of
railroads and municipalities and their effect on early land develop-
ment played a primary role in the formation of surface water law.
Similarly, the evolution of surface water law was affected by the con-
flicting language used to define the common enemy rule and the in-
terpretation given the collection and discharge modification. A review
Marment v. Castlewood Country Club, 30 Cal. App. 3d 483, 105 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1973);
Weldin Farms Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii
156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Klutey v. Commonwealth Dept. of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766
(Ky. 1967); Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978); Johnson v.
Agerbeck, 247 Minn. 432, 77 N.W.2d 539 (1956); County of Clark v. Powers, 96 Nev.
497, 611 P.2d 1072 (1980); Micucci v. White Mountain Trust Co., 114 N.H. 436, 321
A.2d 573 (1974); Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., 45 N.J. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (1957);
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153
N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Dev. Corp.,
62 Ohio St. 2d 55, 402 N.E.2d 1196 (1980); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d
735 (1975); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971); Houston v. Renault,
Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968); Sanford v. Univ. of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d
741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). Accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs S 821-33 (American Law Institute 1979).
57. Argyelan, - Ind. at -, 435 N.E.2d at 978.
58. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, 1261 (5th ed. 1979).
59. See infra notes 122, 132, 133 and accompanying text.
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of the early case law illustrates the weaknesses of the common enemy
doctrine. These deficiencies evidence the need for departure from stare
decisis.
Evolution of the Common Enemy Doctrine
Indiana surface water law began developing in the early nine-
teenth century. Primarily two categories of cases dominated the early
formation and application of the common enemy rule.' Generally, litiga-
tion in the early years involved either municipal corporations61 or
railroads.2 Municipalities were developing streets for transportation
purposes and railroad companies were constructing embankments
across the countryside on which to lay railroad tracks. The land
development served as a catalyst for surface water disputes arising
between big business and private property owners. These conflicts
and the manner in which the courts chose to deal with them played
a significant role in the formation of surface water law. The regula-
tion of property rights for both private and public use is a basis for
the initial adoption of the common enemy rule.'
a. Municipalities and Railroads
The common enemy rule applies to both municipalities and
60. Between 1860 and 1930 most of Indiana's surface water disputes involved
either a municipal corporation or a railroad company. There are very few cases in-
volving farmers, and after 1930 a majority of the litigation is centered on construction
companies and private property owners.
61. Patoka Twp. v. Hopkins, 131 Ind. 142, 30 N.E. 896 (1892); Davis v. Crawford-
sville, 119 Ind. 121 N.E. 449 (1889); Reed v. Cheney, 111 Ind. 387, 12 N.E. 717 (1887);
City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314 (1885); Weis v. City of Madison, 75
Ind. 241 (1881).
62. Hunter v. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. 93 Ind. App. 507, 176 N.E. 710
(1931); Watts v. Evansville Mt. C. & N. Ry., 191 Ind. 27, 129 N.E. 315 (1921); Evansville
Mt. C. & N. Ry. v. Scott, 67 Ind. App. 121, 114 N.E. 649 (1916); Dunn v Chicago I
& L. Ry. 63 Ind. App. 553, 114 N.E. 888 (1917); Vandalia Ry. v. Yeager, 60 Ind. App.
118, 110 N.E. 230 (1915); Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Atkinson, 51 Ind. App. 315,
97 N.E. 353 (1912); New Jersey I. & I. R. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205, 80 N.E. 420 (1907);
Clay v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry., 164 Ind. 439, 73 N.E. 904 (1905); Baltimore &
O.S.W.P. v. Quillan, 34 Ind. App. 330 72 N.E. 661 (1904); New York C. & St. L. R.
C. v. Speelman, 12 Ind. App. 372, 40 N.E. 541 (1895) Jean v. Pennsylvania Co., 9 Ind.
App. 15, 36 N.E. 159 (1894Y Cairo and Vincennes R.R. v. Stevens, 73 Ind. 278 (1881);
Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R.R. v. McAfee, 30 Ind. 291 (1868).
63. This notion is reflected in an Indiana case wherein the court stated, "We
adopt the following language from a case cited herein: 'The elements being for general
and public use, and the benefit appropriated to individuals by occupancy, this occupancy
must be regulated and guarded with a view to individual rights of all who have an
interest in their enjoyment.'" Taylor, 64 Ind. at 174.
[Vol. 18
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/7
SURFACE WATER
private property owners" and the Indiana Supreme Court agreed that
municipal corporations have a legal right to make improvements.
Actions of a municipal corporation are limited by the collection and
discharge modification to the common enemy rule. Subjecting
municipal corporations to the modifications was intended to encourage
care on the part of the municipality so as to avoid injury to private
property and to give proper relief if injury occurred. 5 Furthermore,
the corporations may not be subject to liability for ensuing damages
so long as reasonable care is used." The underlying rationale which
allows a municipal corporation to improve its streets is that the im-
provement is for public use and benefit. Moreover, since the party
whose property is harmed by reason of such general improvement
shares in the general benefit they should not be heard to complain."
The early cases addressing the right of municipal corporations
to develop public streets are significant because development was a
matter of necessity and, in the interest of progress, it benefited the
general public. The presence of both necessity and public benefit
64. One of the first cases in which the court announced application of the
common enemy doctrine to a municipal corporation was Weis, 75 Ind. at 246-47. In
that case a municipal corporation improved its streets by constructing drains and
culverts and by so doing increased the flow of water onto the plaintiff's lot. The court
held for the municipal corporation stating that actions of a municipal corporations are
limited only by the collection and discharge modification to the common enemy rule.
Id. at 253.
65. In Weis, 75 Ind. at 252, the court cites with approval the great Judge
Dillon and adopts his rationale as the one prevailing in the state. Judge Dillon said that:
When water is gathered into one channel and cast upon plaintiff's
land and causes a positive and direct invasion of plaintiff's private prop-
erty, to his damage, water which would not otherwise have flowed or
found its way there, the corporation is liable. If properly applied (emphasis
added) the exception, founded on sound principle, will have a salutory
effect in inducing care on part of a municipality to avoid injuries to private
property and will give redress to the sufferer if such injuries are inflicted.
Id. Unfortunately, recent case law indicates that the modification is being improperly
applied in Indiana.
66. Id. at 250. The same general rule was stated differently in Davis, 119
Ind. at 1-2, 21 N.E. at 449-50, where the court said that a municipal corporation is
not liable for "consequential damages" caused by grading and improvement of its streets
unless it is negligently done. It is clear from the case that any damage occurring from
an act authorized by law will be labeled as consequential injury and not direct injury.
This is significant as the court will impose liability and assess damages only when
the act of the municipal corporation causes direct injury. Weis, 75 Ind. at 250 (Em-
phasis added) Note also that the "reasonable care" language does seem to give the
municipal corporation a slightly different standard than it does to the private proper-
ty owner.
67. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. 51 Ind. App. at 317, 97 N.E. at 355.
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minimized the harshness of permitting a municipality to divert sur-
face water at the expense of the residential owner.
In addition to municipal activities, necessity and public benefit
are also noticeably present in surface water disputes involving railroad
companies. A railroad possesses the right to protect its right of way
from surface water which would otherwise flow upon it from adjoin-
ing lands as long as it does not interfere with any natural or prescrip-
tive watercourse." Therefore, a railroad has the right to improve and
change its roadbed and raise and lower the grade if such change will
improve its efficiency." Like municipal corporations, the common
enemy rule governs harmful diversion of surface water resulting from
the development of railroads" so improvements can be made without
liability to adjoining landowners.
The rationale behind the railroad's right to make improvements
without liability for diversion of surface water is, in part, based upon
economics. An Indiana court explained that such improvements do not
constitute additional burdens not included in compensation previous-
ly paid to the private owners for the railroad's right of way."
Therefore, the injured property owner has already been paid for any
damages occurring from diversion of surface water caused by the con-
struction of railroads. Application of the common enemy doctrine under
such circumstances is not inequitable. Absent necessity, public benefit,
or economic reimbursement, however, the rule is inequitable. While
this early case law indicates an intent to avoid unjust application of
the common enemy doctrine, principles of reasonable use of property
have been omitted from subsequent Indiana surface water decisions.
b. Problems with Semantics
One of the first cases in Indiana involving water lawn established
68. Jean, 9 Ind. App. 15, 36 N.E. 159. "When surface water begins to flow
in a definite direction and there is a regular channel formed with well defined banks
and bottom and water flows therein, not necessarily continually, but for time immemorial
and for a substantial period each year, it is a water course." Id. See also infra note
94 and accompanying text.
69. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., 51 Ind. at 317, 97 N.E. at 355.
70. The common enemy doctrine was first applied to a lawsuit involving a
railroad in Cairo & Vincennes R.R. 73 Ind. 278. Therein the court said that the railroad
could lawfully build an embankment which stopped the drainage of surface water from
plaintiffs property even though the result was the flooding of his property. Id. at 283..
71. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., 51 Ind. at 317, 97 N.E. at 355.
72. Trustee of the Wabash and Erie Canal v. Spears, 16 Ind. 441, 442 (1861).
This case involved water law in general and not surface water law exclusively. The
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the general proposition that an individual may use his own property
as he desires, so long as he is reasonably careful that such use shall
not injure others.73 It is clear that a property owner was not liable
for indirect damages occurring from the legitimate use of his land.
The court did, however, recognize a duty on the part cf a landowner
to exercise reasonable care in the use and enjoyment of his property.
Language advocating reasonable use of property is found in Taylor
v. Fickas, the first Indiana case encouraging adoption of the common
enemy rule.74 The language favoring equitable application of the rule
in that case75 is conspicuously omitted in later cases which cite Taylor
as controlling authority. 6 The omitted language indicates an intent
to apply a rule of law while still giving due regard for others' rights
in property. The omission of the language has led to the creation of
a right to fight surface water, pursuant to the common enemy doc-
trine, without adequate regard for the rights of others.
Before adoption of the common enemy rule, Indiana courts
recognized that diversion of surface water from the land of another
by excavation of one's own land or the backing of water upon another's
land by means of dams were injuries for which an action lay at com-
mon law.77 At that time, damages for injuries to health and personal
comfort caused by another's use of land were based upon nuisance
law. Adoption of the common enemy rule diminished the use of
nuisance law in surface water disputes because it conferred upon a
property owner an unlimited right to divert surface water from his
land. In defining nuisance, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that
facts involve a suit against the trustee of the Wabash and the Erie Canal to recover
damages occasioned by the flowing of water upon the plaintiffs land, resulting from
the raising of a dam across the Wabash River. Although this is a case involving a
watercourse, it was not clear at this time in history whether overflowing water caused
by damming of a natural watercourse constituted surface water. The court did ad-
dress surface water, but was speaking in terms of general land use when utilizing
the reasonable care language.
73. See id. at 442.
74. Taylor, 64 Ind. 167.
75. There are several indications in Taylor that the court did not condone
strict application of the common enemy doctrine. First, the court in Taylor said the
maxim, sic utere tuo it alienun non loedus meant no more than that everyone must
so enjoy his property according to his legal right. The legal right to substantially
damage another's property evolved after Taylor. The court acknowledged that it is
impossible to use your own property without causing injury to another in slight degree,
showing no intent to condone substantial injury. Finally, the court said that the
aforementioned maxim "must be taken and construed with an eye to the natural rights
of all." Id. at 174.
76. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
77. Trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal, 16 Ind. at 443.
19841
Rinkenberger: Landowner's Right to Fight Surface Water: The Apprehension of the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
496 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.18
unless an act was in violation of a right, despite the inconvenience,
annoyance, discomfort, injury, or damage resulting therefrom, the act
is not a nuisance and the party injured thereby is without remedy."
Throughout these decisions the notion evolved that although it is not
a nuisance to do what the law authorizes, it may be tortious to do
the authorized act in a negligent manner."9 Under this rationale a
nuisance action will lie only when there has been a violation of the
collection and discharge modification of the common enemy rule."
Therefore, in Indiana, each property owner has a legal right to fight
surface water as long as it is not collected in volume and discharged
onto the property below. In giving each landowner the right to fight
surface water, Indiana has, in effect, legalized a nuisance. Courts
acknowledge that much error exists in the expression that a landowner
has the right to fight surface water as best he can."1 Analysis of past
and present application of the common enemy doctrine indicates there
is more truth than error involved because of the limited protection
provided pursuant to the common enemy doctrine and its modification.
Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that the common
enemy doctrine has been clearly defined and applied without confu-
sion by lower courts since 1878.2 However, the language utilized by
the courts in defining the rule, coupled with the difficulty in deter-
mining when water constitutes "surface" water, indicates an area of
perpetual confusion.' The common enemy rule was first stated as
giving landowners the right to "fence and cultivate" their fields
without being liable for slight and temporary damages resulting
therefrom." Two years later the court, citing to the civil law rule,
restricted the right of an upper owner to divert surface water as re-
78. Benthal v. Seifert, 77 Ind. 302, 306 (1881).
79. City of North Vernon, 103 Ind. at 327.
80. See supra notes 14, 15, 39, 40 and accompanying text.
81. In Patoka Twp., 131 Ind. 142, 30 N.E. 896, the court stated "Surface water
is a common enemy which the landowner may fight off his land as best he may. While
there is some truth in the statement, there is much error." Id. The court was referr-
ing to the fact that a landowner cannot collect surface water and discharge it in a
concentrated flow onto the lands below.
82. Argyelan, - Ind. at __, 435 N.E.2d at 977.
83. A good indication of the ongoing confusion surrounding the distinction
between surface water and a natural watercourse is the statement made by Justice
Moran in Evansville M. C. & N. Ry. 67 Ind. App. 121, 114 N.E. 649: "In view of the
innumerable decisions and want of harmony of the courts as to the character of water
that should be regarded as of a natural watercourse or flood waters of a stream, an
attempt to clarify the same would lead to endless confusion." Id. at 132, 114 N.E.
at 653. See also infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
84. Taylor, 64 Ind. at 176.
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quired by good husbandry, but did not determine the right of the
lower property owner. 5 After acknowledging the inconsistency bet-
ween existing formulas and conceding the difficulty in formulating a
general rule applicable to varying circumstances, the court expressly
adopted the common enemy rule." Unfortunately, this marked the
beginning rather than the end of confusion and injustice brought about
by the application of the "right to fight" doctrine.
The definition presently cited with approval by Indiana courts
states that a landowner may do whatever is necessary 7 to keep sur-
face water from flowing across his property. However, once the water
is on his property, he must either keep it within his boundaries or
allow it to drain naturally from his property onto the land of another,
unless within the limits of his land he can turn it into a natural
watercourse."8 This definition suggests that a property owner can
divert surface water to protect his property from injury and resembles
a hybrid of the common enemy and civil law rules.8 Although the
rule defines the right to divert surface water in terms of serving a
protective function," "mere" surface water is legally diverted for
countless reasons. In labeling the water as "merely" surface water 1
the court is advocating injury without remedy in surface water
disputes. Compensation for injury to property is denied when mere
surface water is a casual factor, but a different result is probable
where a watercourse is involved.'
85. Templeton v. Voshloe, 72 Ind. 134 (1880). Note also the use of good husban-
dry language as it is very similar to a reasonable care limitation on the use of land.
86. Cairo, 73 Ind. 278.
87. The landowner is limited by the following: (1) the act must be done within
or upon the boundaries of his own land; (2) he cannot interfere with a natural or prescrip-
tive watercourse; and (3) he may erect levees to ward off surface water that are of
reasonable height. Thompson v. Dyar, 126 Ind. App. 70, 74, 130 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1955).
88. Cairo, 73 Ind. at 283-84.
89. For one explanation for the rule enunciated in Cairo see, e.g., Shaffer,
supra note 30, at 88.
90. See generally, Dunn, 63 Ind. App. 553, 114 N.E. 888; Clay, 164 Ind. 439,
73 N.E. 904; and Jean, 9 Ind. App. 56, 36 N.E. 159.
91. In addressing surface water, the court precedes the term with the adjec-
tive "mere" indicating to the author that the court believes surface water is neither
capable of substantial injury, nor deserving of much attention. Mere is defined as
"nothing more than" or "simply". See language in New York C. & St. L. R., 12 Ind.
App. at 374, 40 N.E. at 543; Clay, 164 Ind. at 440, 73 N.E. at 905.
92. The characterization of surface water as being "merely" surface water
is based on the distinction between surface water and a natural watercourse. See infra
notes 1 and 68 and accompanying text. The common enemy doctrine governs surface
water disputes while the rule governing watercourse is as follows:
Every riparian owner is entitled to have the watercourse continue
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Before the common enemy rule can be applied consistently and
fairly to surface water disputes, the court must develop an intelligi-
ble definition of surface water. In Indiana, surface water is governed
by the common enemy doctrine, while water flowing in a natural
watercourse is governed by a rule of reasonable use." Therefore,
proper characterization of the water determines which standard will
apply. The definition of surface water is an issue of considerable con-
troversy and has been approached from several perspectives. Indiana
precedent indicates a myriad of definitions varying from the
complicated" to the elementary.95 The major areas of controversy
center on flood waters," small or erratic channels,' over-run from tile
to flow through or along his lands in its accustomed channel and natural
volume, without any injurious obstructions or detention of the waters by
other owners, except as may be occasioned by the reasonable use of such
waters by other riparian owners.
Davidson v. Mathis, __ Ind. App. 389 N.E.2d 364, 366 (1979).
93. Id.
94. A direct cite from Evansville Mt. C. & N. Ry. is indicative of the state
of the law in 1916:
After collecting the authorities on this subject it was held in Vandalia,
that flood waters flowing without the ordinary channel under some cir-
cumstances should be classed as part of a stream rather than surface water,
and waters overflowing the natural channel flowing down the course of
a stream in a uniform current with it, and at such regular intervals as
to form what is known as a high-water channel should be classed as waters
of a stream rather than as in part surface water, and that under some
circumstances a stream is classed as a natural water course in the absence
of a well-defined channel as the term is usually understood, as where the
water in its course spreads over a considerable breadth of land.
Evansville Mt. C. & N. Ry., 67 Ind. App. at 136, 114 N.E. at 654.
95. The court took a simpler approach in Ramsey v. Ketchem, 73 Ind. App.
200, 127 N.E. 204 (1920). After citing various possible definitions for surface water,
the appellate court concluded that the lower court doubtlessly interpreted the term
in its ordinary sense; that is, water collected on the surface of the ground! Id. at 204.
96. In Jean, 9 Ind. App. 56, 36 N.E. 159, the court held that overflow from
a river in time of high water is surface water. By 1916, the court in Evansville Mt.
C. & N. Ry., 67 Ind. App. at 137, 114 N.E. at 654, acknowledged the "endless confu-
sion" surrounding prior attempts to classify surface water and after a general over-
view of the conflicting holdings adopted the rule that flood waters which leave the
channel of a stream and spread to adjacent lands running in different directions becomes
surface water. In Mitchell v. Bain, 142 Ind. 604, 614, 42 N.E. 230, 233 (1895), the court
stated that a stream does not cease to be a watercourse because it spreads out for
a distance without a defined channel. Therefore, in certain instances, surface water
must reach a natural watercourse and then overflow to be immune from the common
enemy doctrine.
97. In New York C. & St. L. Ry., 12 Ind. App. at 374, 40 N.E. at 543, the
court stated that channels leading off the Yellow River were "mere surface water
drains" as a watercourse must be a living stream confined in a channel. In New Jersey
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drainways,98 and more recently, treated water expelled from an aera-
tion system." Although several tests exists to aid in determining what
constitutes surface water, 'l uniform characterization of water remains
a disputed issue.
When a stream overflows its banks, the issue becomes whether
that water is characterized as flood water or surface water. The deter-
mination is ultimately based upon the length of time the water re-
mains outside the channel, the continuity and direction of the current
and the probability of its return to the original stream. ' ' It is dif-
ficult to characterize water flowing within a bed and banks because
frequently it does not meet the requirement for a watercourse.' 2 The
issue becomes confused further when the banks are man-made rather
than a product of erosion, or, when the water draining through the
channel is surface water as opposed to spring fed water. Confusion
also arises when a ditch is substituted with tile drainage and its banks
are later obliterated. 3 Characterizing water which either flows on
I. & I. Ry., 168 Ind. at 211, 80 N.E. at 423, the court said that a drainage ditch fed
by no spring water or watercourse and used and construed solely for expediting
surface drainage is mere surface water. While the court in Watts, 191 Ind. at 44, 129
N.E. at 320, said that water running over land outside and apart from any natural
or artificial watercourse is surface water. And in Thompson, 126 Ind. App. at 74, 130
N.E.2d at 54, the court stated that damming a flood channel to a watercourse falls
entirely within the common enemy doctrine because the damming had no effect on
the flow of water in the natural watercourse.
98. In Capes v. Barger, 123 Ind. App. 212, 216, 109 N.E.2d 725, 727 (1953),
the court said that when tile is laid in a natural watercourse and filled over, obliterating
the banks, it still remains a watercourse, and when it overflows, the overflow does
not become surface water against which a landowner can protect himself. But, when
the rainfall is so abundant that it all cannot be carried off by the tile drain or the
land, the surplus is surface water. Similarly, the court in Gwinn, 234 Ind. at 567, 129
N.E.2d at 228, held that water flowing in a surface channel over a line of tile is a
natural watercourse because it was a natural watercourse before it was tiled and filled
in.
99. The court in Kramer v. Roger, __ Ind. App. - , 441 N.E.2d 700 (1982),
held that effluent discharge from an aeration system was surface water, to which Judge
Ratliff dissented, stating that:
Surface water, under all accepted definitions, is water derived from
totally natural sources, such as falling rains or melting snows, which is
diffused over the surface of the ground and which temporarily flows upon
the ground along the natural contours of the surface of the land, follow-
ing no defined course or channel.
Id. at 707.
100. See generally Shaffer, supra note 30, at 79-81.
101. Evansville Mt. C. & N. Ry., 67 Ind. App. at 132-37, 114 N.E.2d at 652-54.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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top of the tile drain where the banks used to be or which is excess
water incapable of flowing in the drain, is difficult. Finally, with the
development of aerator systems, the question arises whether water
must be derived from a totally natural source to constitute surface
water."4 Consequently, the definition of surface water is in part con-
jecture and there is a presumption in favor of characterizing water
as "merely" surface water. Given the ambiguity in defining what con-
stitutes surface water, it is an additional inequity to place the burden
of proof on the party alleging otherwise.' 5 The fallibility of the com-
mon enemy rule is increased through interpretation and subsequent
application of the collection and discharge modification.
c. Interpretation of Collection and Discharge Modification
In general, the collection and discharge modification to the com-
mon enemy rule states that a landowner cannot collect surface water
in an artificial channel and cast it in a body upon another's land.0 6
Violation of the collection and discharge modification results in "direct"
injury for which liability is inferred. 7 The extent to which the
modification mitigates the harshness of the common enemy doctrine
is not ascertainable by a reading of early case law. However, the case
law reflects optimism that by adopting the collection and discharge
modification, damage to property arising from unreasonable diversion
of surface water will be deterred. 8 In response to judicial concern
over landowners "profiting from their own wrongs,"'0 9 the initial in-
terpretation permitted viable use of the modification in surface water
disputes. When properly interpreted, the doctrine has proven effec-
tive in arduous cases" and practical when applied to simple downspout
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105. The court in Ramsey, 73 Ind. App. at 204, 127 N.E. at 206, stated that
the plaintiff, complaining of an adjoining landowner constructing a dam at the edge
of his property and throwing waters within a ditch back onto the plaintiff's property,
had the burden of proving that the water was not surface water.
106. Weis, 75 Ind. at 248-49.
107. Id. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
108. Weis, 75 Ind. at 248-49. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
109. In Gaskill v. Barnett, 52 Ind. App. 654, 657, 101 N.E. 40, 43 (1913), wagon
wheels wore trenches in the ground through which water was running into a ditch,
across a depression and onto appellee's land. The court said that even if the appellant
had a prescriptive right to drain surface water into a channel on appellee's land, such
right would not authorize him to wrongfully accumulate additional water and pour
the same onto appellee's land. Therefore, the appellant violated the collection and
discharge modification by the mere passage of water through the wagon tracks, onto
appellee's land. The court stated that to permit the appellant to continue such acts
would be to allow him to profit from his own wrong.
110. An "arduous" case refers to a case in which there has been an extreme
[Vol. 18
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drainage."' Despite the potential for effectiveness, problems arising
from interpretation and application have rendered the modification
ineffective.
A close examination of the language used to define the collec-
tion and discharge modification exposes the ambiguity arising from
the various interpretations given it by the courts."2 The courts are
confronted with the troublesome task of uniform interpretation since
the meaning given to the various phrases of the collection and
discharge modification varies with the underlying fact situation."' The
outcome in each situation may be based entirely upon semantics,"'
diversion of surface water so that water usually flowing away from property is reversed
and begins to flow onto the property. Therefore, when surface water is collected and
discharged into a channel, thereby reversing the flow of water, so that if floods the
same property that it used to drain, the collection and discharge modification man-
dates liability for damages. See generally Baltimore & 0. S. W. R., 34 Ind. App. 330,
72 N.E. 661; Patoka Twp. 131 Ind. 142, 30 N.E. 896; Reed v. Chaney, 111 Ind. 387,
12 N.E. 717 (1887).
111. The court in Connor v. Woodfill, 126 Ind. 85, 25 N.E. 876 (1890), found
that water flowing through the downspouts of a church and onto adjoining residential
property, constituted a trespass for which the church was held liable. Imposing liabili-
ty for flooding of property caused by water collected within downspouts and cast upon
adjoining property has been cited as being the major function of the collection and
discharge modification in Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26 at 91.
112. The collection and discharge modification has been worded in the follow-
ing ways:
(a) A municipal corporation cannot collect surface water in an artificial
channel and pour it onto the land of another. Davis, 119 Ind. 1, 21 N.E.
449 (emphasis added).
(b) Appellees are trespassors whenever they shed water from their
building so as to throw it upon appellant's lot. Connor, 126 Ind. 85, 25
N.E. 876 (emphasis added).
(c) A landowner cannot wrongfully accumulate additional water and pour
the same on adjoining land. Gaskill, 52 Ind. App. at 661, 101 N.E. at 43
(emphasis added).
d) There is no right to collect surface water in a volume and discharge
it on the lands of another. Hunter, 93 Ind. App. at 513, 176 N.E. at 712
(emphasis added).
(e) If an upper landowner alters the natural condition of land so as to
change the course of water or concentrate it at a particular point or by
artificial means, increase its volume, he is liable. Central Indiana Coal
Co. v. Goodman, 111 Ind. App. 480, 485 39 N.E.2d 484, 487 (1942) (em-
phasis added).
If) Landowner cannot collect a surplus of surface water on a railroad right-
of-way and discharge it in a body on adjoining land. Pittsburgh C. C. &
St. L. Ry., 51 Ind. App. at 323, 97 N.E. at 356 (emphasis added).
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114. The problem with semantics has been cited by at least one commentator
as another valid point in favor of a state adopting the rule of reasonable use. See
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yet the case law offers no clear guide as to what meaning will be
given the various terms. The rule is therefore subject to numerous
interpretations, resulting in the minimization of its predictability.
Minimization of predictability, however, is not the sole reason
for deterioration of the collection and discharge modification. A once
viable rule may be rendered meaningless if the court either applies
the rule in a perfunctory manner without due regard for changing
circumstances or destroys the fundamental premise of the rule by
creating exceptions to the rule. The Indiana courts are guilty of
violating both of the above,"5 and as a result, the present viability
of the collection and discharge modification is questionable. Applica-
tion of the rule without due regard for changing circumstances has
played a substantial role in subsequent inequitable decisions.
Recently, in Gene B. Glick Co. v. Marion Construction Corp."'
the Indiana Court of Appeals recited the common enemy rule and
applied its modification in the same manner as it was first applied
in the early nineteenth century. 17 The court said that "the upper
owner may make such drains on his land as are required by good
husbandry and proper improvement of the surface of the ground."'..
Reiterating the collection and discharge modification, the court stated
that the upper owner cannot by drains or ditches concentrate surface
water and discharge it onto a lower landowner in places where it never
flowed before."' Obviously the right to improve one's land carries with
it different connotations now than it did in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. "Improvements" then entailed farming one's ground, building
a railroad track or grading city streets. "Improvement" today is like-
generally Note, Adoption of the Reasonable Use Rule in North Carolina for Surface Water
Drainage Between Adjoining Landowners, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 866 (1978).
115. The court in Gene B. Glick Co. v. Marion Constr. Corp., 165 Ind. App.
72, 331 N.E.2d 26 (1975) reh. denied 333 N.E.2d 140, violated the first of these two
rules, and the court in Argyelan, - Ind. - , 435 N.E. 2d 973 violated the other.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. It should be noted that had it not been
for the court's endorsement in Glick of finding no liability for an increase in the quan-
tity of surface water discharged onto an adjoining lot, the inequitable decision in
Argyelan may not have occurred. The landowner ultimately should not be permitted
to so alter his land nor to escape liability through the exception to the modification
enunciated in Argyelan. See infra notes 138, 145 and accompanying text.
116. 165 Ind. App. 72, 331 N.E.2d 26.
117. In Glick the court reiterated the common enemy doctrine as it was set
forth in Templeton, 72 Ind. 134.
118. This portion is taken verbatim from Templeton. Glick, 165 Ind. App. at
77, 331 N.E.2d at 31.
119. This too is a mere re-iteration of the rule in Templeton. Id.
120. See supra notes 61, 62, 84 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/7
SURFACE WATER
ly to encompass raising a lot, cementing the surface and constructing
a commercial building. 12 1 This failure to recognize a change in land
development techniques resulted in the rule that:
A landowner may improve his land by changing the
surface and causing water to accumulate thereon, to stand
in unusual quantities on adjacent land, or to pass into or
over it in greater quantities or in other directions; and he
may elevate or depress his land to change the flow."
This rule of law imposes very little restraint on a landowner and
leaves even less upon which to base the collection and discharge
modification. This fact, combined with the recent exception to the rule
enunciated by the Indiana Supreme Court in Argyelan renders the
present status of surface water law in Indiana offensive to prevailing
jurisprudence. 23
Indiana's Current Posture on Surface Water
Rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular
case and may also unduly restrict proper development of the law.24
Proceeding on the premise that common law is judge-made law' 2' and
that the courts have a responsibility to change such law "where strict
adherence creates harsh and unjust results,"' 21 the appellate court of
the third district in Rounds v. Hoelscher" recently adopted the rule
of reasonable use. The appellate court's adoption of the reasonable
use rule stemmed from a belief that Indiana has been applying com-
peting rules to surface water disputes in that the common enemy doc-
121. See generally Note, Rules in Urban Areas, supra note 26.
122. Glick, 165 Ind. App. at 77, 331 N.E.2d at 31, citing Weddell v. Hapner,
124 Ind. 315, 24 N.E. 368 (1890).
123. The law as it stands after Glick and Argyelan is that a commercial owner
may improve his property at the expense of the residential owner. In Cloverleaf Farms,
Inc. v. Surratt, 169 Ind. App. 554, 555, 349 N.E.2d 731, 732 (1976), a construction com-
pany was permitted to raise its land, thereby causing surface water which had previous-
ly flowed across its own land to stand on that of the adjoining residential owner so
long as it did not "collect surface water in a body and then discharge it onto another's
land." The court said the residential owner could dam against the water so as not
to incur damage. The feasibility of the lower owner damming and the rationale that
the burden should be placed on him is troublesome.
124. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 321 (1974).
125. Id.
126. A belief stated by Judge Ratliff in Jines v. Roberts, - Ind. App. -'
433 N.E.2d 397 (1982).
127. Rounds, __ Ind. - 428 N.E.2d 1308 (1981). See infra note 136 and
accompanying text for facts of case.
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trine is applied to the lower owner and the civil law rule to the up-
per owner.128 The result is that a landowner is free from liability to
an upper owner for damming back surface water, as the common
enemy rule advocates the "right to fight" surface water. However,
an upper owner is liable to a lower owner for the unnatural channel-
ing of water if it flows around the dam, as the upper owner is govern-
ed by the collection and discharge modification." Thus liability is
predicated upon the owner's "posture on the hill,""' and not by an
evaluation of all factors.
The court of appeals, in stating that an owner has no absolute
right to improve his land at the expense of his neighbor"' was follow-
ing what appears to be the original intent of the initial framers of
Indiana's surface water laws. 3 ' It is conceded that the appellate court
disregarded stare decisis in concluding that liability should be based
on the reasonableness of the conduct involved. It is also true that
the appellate court is bound by prior decisions of the Indiana Supreme
Court until precedent is changed either by the Indiana Supreme Court
or by legislative enactment.'33 Alternatively, it must also be
acknowledged that a court should not "close its eyes to change or
disregard reality."u For if the court does so, and consequently
perpetuates a rule founded on an antiquated notion, it is precedent
alone which is honored.'35
A triology of recent Indiana decisions supports the conclusion
that Indiana has chosen precedent over an obvious need for change.'36
128. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
129. Rounds, - Ind. App. , 428 N.E.2d at 1314-15.
130. Id. at __, 428 N.E.2d at 1315.
131. The court announced the new rule that every landowner has the right
to reasonably use his own property so as not to cause unnecessary injury to another
in light of all surrounding circumstances. Listing seven factors relevant to the deter-
mination of reasonableness, and applying them to this situation the court found for
the defendants. The seven factors listed by the court as relevant are: (1) the im-
provements being the cause in fact of the injury; (2) the nature and importance of
the improvements; (3) the relative value of the harm compared to the improvements;
(4) the foreseeability or remoteness of the injury; (5) the extent of the interference
with the surface water; (6) the availability of mutual solutions to the water drainage
problems; and (7) the negligence or willful misconduct by a party acting to control
surface water. Id,
132. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
133. Miller v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App. 148, 189 N.E.2d 720 (1963).
134. Swafford v. State, - Ind. - 421 N.E.2d 596, 600 (1981).
135. Citing from Justice Hunter's dissent in Boland v. Greer, , Ind. -'
__, 422 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (1981).
136. The trilogy of cases which are indicative of Indiana's current position on
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It is important to understand the facts and holdings of Argyelan v.
Haviland, Rounds v. Hoelscher, and Gilmer v. Board of Marshall
County, as their interplay with one another demonstrates an unwill-
ingness on the part of the Indiana Supreme Court to address timely
issues.
Recently, a case came before the Indiana Supreme Court that
exposed apparent weaknesses in the common enemy rule. The
Argyelan case was brought before the court in April of 1981. The
Havilands, the plaintiffs in the case, were residential owners, and the
Argyelans, the defendants, purchased a lot near the residential prop-
erty of the plaintiffs. The defendants requested that their property
be zoned commercial, the lot was raised three feet, and was black-
topped, thereby substantially increasing the surface water flow onto
the plaintiffs' property. The defendants also built a retaining wall on
their property, thereby diffusing the surface water collected in their
downspouts before it was "thrown" onto the adjoining, residential prop-
erty. In the suit brought by the Havilands against the Argyelans the
trial court found for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals, however, found
for the commercial owner on the ground that the acts by the defen-
dants did not fall within the collection and discharge modification to
the common enemy rule. The loss to the residential owners of the
use and enjoyment of their property was labeled as merely "inciden-
tal" and therefore without remedy. The plaintiffs petitioned for
transfer to the Supreme Court.
While the petition for transfer was pending, both Rounds and
Gilmer came before the appellate court of the third district. The defen-
dants in Rounds, the Hoelschers, purchased a lot for residential pur-
poses and due to drainage problems, the lot was raised to street level
and a cement curb was installed, both of which stopped the flow of
surface water into and across their lot. Ten years later, the plaintiffs,
the Rounds, purchased an adjacent lot. Between the lots and located
on the plaintiffs' property, a swale existed upon which water stood.
The plaintiffs extended their basement to the area beneath the swale
and standing water. Later, the basement collapsed and the plaintiffs
sought relief. The trial court found for the defendants and the plain-
tiffs appealed alleging a misapplication of the common enemy rule.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, but based the
affirmation upon the rule of reasonable use.
In Gilmer, the defendant built a dike to stop flooding of his farm,
which in turn caused flooding to the road. The road commissioner re-
quested, and the trial court granted, an injunction forcing the defen-
dant to remove the levee on the grounds that repelling surface water
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created a nuisance. Defendant's petition to dissolve the injunction was
denied. The appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions
that the trial court utilize the rule of reasonable use.
Subsequently, the supreme court granted the Havilands' petition
for transfer in Argyelan, and apparently irrevocably bound by stari
decisis, rejected the rule of reasonable use. The supreme court revers-
ed the holding of the trial court and vacated the ruling of the court
of appeals, rejecting their analysis, but nonetheless finding for the
commercial owner. Shortly thereafter, the Gilmer defendant filed a
petition for transfer which was denied by the supreme court. Grant-
ing the transfer would have provided the court with an opportunity
to re-examine the holding in Argyelan and was a perfect opportunity
for the court to address the potential applicability of Indiana's nuisance
statutes in surface water disputes. The court's refusal to address either
the rule of reasonable use, nuisance law, or a possible due care
modification to the common enemy rule in spite of both the oppor-
tunity and necessity, reflects a stubborn adherence to stari decisis.
The facts of Argyelan epitomized a prevalent problem area in
surface water law. The supreme court in Argyelan found no liability
on the part of a private commercial owner for damage done to an
adjoining residential owner. Although the commercial owner altered
his property so as to increase both the rate and flow of water onto
the residential lot, i"7 the resultant flooding did not amount to a viola-
tion of the collection and discharge modification.138 The reasons given
water law are Argyelan v. Haviland, __ Ind. App. -, 418 N.E.2d 569 (1981), pet.
granted, 435 N.E.2d 973 (1982); Rounds v. Hoelscher, Ind. App. - 428 N.E.2d
1308 (1981); and Gilmer v. Board of Commissioners of Marshall County, __ Ind. App.
__, 428 N.E.2d 1318 (1981), pet. denied 439 N.E.2d 1358 (1982).
137. The facts in Argyelan are identical to the hypothetical. Unlike surround-
ing states, see infra notes 156-58, 162-65 and accompanying text, the Indiana courts
have expressly legalized severe alteration of a property's natural surface. See supra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
138. The appellate court in Argyelan listed three elements necessary before
the collection and discharge modification is applied: (1) collecting surface water; (2)
discharging it; (3) in a concentrated flow. __ Ind. App. at -, 418 N.E.2d at 571.
The court goes on to distinguish Connor, 126 Ind. 85, 25 N.E. 876, the only other
downspout case in Indiana. In Connor, water was collected into gutters and discharg-
ed in a concentrated fashion by downspouts onto adjoining land. The court there-in
found trespass and subsequent liability. The appellate court distinguished Connor on
various grounds. First the court said all three elements were present in Connor and
the court in Connor merely used the word "throw" in place of the third requirement
that the water enter the property in concentrated flow. This violation is labeled by
the court as a "positive wrong," something lacking in the Argyelan case. In Argyelan,
the water was not cast, thrown or poured so as to violate the collection and discharge
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss2/7
SURFACE WATER
by the court for the continued application of the common enemy doc-
trine in light of the inequities here involved are insignificant 1" and
easily refuted.4 ° Consequently, the opinion in Argyelan is subject to
criticism, as it reflects a refusal by the court to address the impor-
tant issues confronting it by strict adherence to the common enemy
doctrine.
There is a general omission of the relevant facts in the majority
opinion of Argyelan..' as well as a failure to discuss current changes
modification. The retaining wall, constructed by the defendant caused the water to
diffuse before entering and flooding the plaintiffs property. The court then rationalizes
that because the water was not concentrated, the wrong was not actionable. Argyelan
adds support to the argument that cases turn on mere semantics. See supra notes
112-14 and accompanying text. It appears that though water flowing over a retaining
wall "diffuses" the water, and may not amount to a "cast" or "throw" it is surely
a "pour," since pour is defined as flowing in a "stream." This leads directly back to
the initial problem of semantics to determine what will constitute a stream. The im-
portant issue however, is that the damage which resulted from the overflow was both
substantial and unnecessary regardless of its label.
139. The courts elaborate reasoning for the continued application of the com-
mon enemy rule in spite of the particularly inequitable situation before the court in-
cluded the following: "Though the common enemy doctrine inflicts hardships, it is as
fair to one as the other." Argyelan, - Ind. at - , 435 N.E.2d at 977. "It has worked
satisfactorily since it was adopted and it is well understood." Id. "Someone must be
given the advantage in surface water problems and if it must be someone, it may
as well be the owner at the top of the hill." Id. "The rule of reasonable use is flexible,
but unpredictable, and the fact that a majority of states have adopted the rule is
not proof that their way is better." Id. at -, 435 N.E.2d at 976.
140. First, the court contradicts itself in saying the rule is as fair to one as
another and then conceding that the upper owner has the advantage over the lower.
Examination of the case law discloses two consistent losers, the lower owner and the
private property owner. It is also obvious that the common enemy rule is neither
well understood nor satisfactorily applied. It is difficult to ascertain what rule is being
applied, there is no clear definition of surface water, and the collection and discharge
modification is ambiguous. The case law has been in a constant state of confusion since
1861. The common enemy doctrine has the potential for being both inflexible and un-
predictable. Surely, the adoption of the rule of reasonable use by twenty jurisdictions
further indicates its viability. If nothing else, it is a clear indication of dissatisfaction
with both the common enemy and civil law doctrines.
141. The plaintiffs purchased their lot in 1948 and invested much time, money
and effort into improving the property and maintaining the yard. In 1970 the defen-
dant purchased his lot for commercial purposes. Prior to the alteration of the surface,
the plaintiffs experienced no flooding. Furthermore, as the plaintiff's owned their prop-
erty for twenty-two years, the discharge of surface water onto their lot amounted
to an interference with a prior and existing use of property. Because of the eventual
flooding over $7,500.00 worth of damages occurred. Antiques stored within the garage
were damaged, the garage floor cracked from uneven settling, water rot occurred around
the base of the garage, the floor of the utility shed was ruined, the driveway eroded,
and the plaintiffs lost the use and enjoyment of their yard. Nonetheless, the damages
were labeled merely incidental and liability denied.
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affecting surface water law. It is apparent from the facts that a
residential owner shared in the expense of another's commercial gain,
while there is no reciprocal "public benefit" to either the plaintiff or
the public in general. Subsidizing such private commercial gain appears
violative of public policy. Nor does the court recognize changes which
have transpired in land development since the formation of Indiana
surface water laws. Such a failure is detrimental considering that over
sixty-five percent (65%) of Indiana's population is presently residing
in urban areas."2
An equitable resolution of surface water disputes is dependent
upon inquiry into all relevant facts.Y Nonetheless the Indiana Supreme
Court is unwilling to fully address the issues of this particular case
or the merits of the rule of reasonable use. By foregoing the oppor-
tunity to consider any facts beyond who is the "upper owner" and
by refusing to acknowledge that progress may necessitate a change
in law, the court is doing the public a disservice. The court's failure
to recognize the need for change, coupled with its recent interpreta-
tion of the collection and discharge modification, reflects forbearance
of equity for predictability.
The Indiana Supreme Court also declined in Argyelan to adopt
the due care modification to the common enemy rule,' and in fact
interpreted the collection and discharge modification so as to strip
it of viability."5 The true irony is that Indiana courts were more likely
and more willing to find a violation of the collection and discharge
modification in earlier cases. Water flowing through downspouts 4. and
water pouring into trenches made from wagon wheels 47 were found
142. Shaffer, Surface Water in Indiana, 39 IND. L.J. 69 (1963).
143. See generally Comment, Discharge Injurious to Neighbor, supra note 34.
144. The court stated that "although Indiana would not permit a malicious or
wanton employment of one's drainage rights under the common enemy doctrine, it
appears that the only limitation upon such rights that we have this far judicially
recognized is that one may not collect or concentrate surface water and cast it, in
a body, upon his neighbor." Argyelan, - Ind. at - , 435 N.E.2d at 976.
145. Defendants, the owner of the commercial lot, had their roof, downspouts
and general grade of the land all sloping towards the plaintiffs property. They col-
lected the surface water into gutters and directed it through downspouts towards
the plaintiffs home. After the water poured out of the downspout, yet before it entered
the plaintiffs property, the water was diffused by flowing over a small retaining wall.
The court rationalized that, 'Ithe distinction lies in the character of the flow as it
entered the adjoining property. That water was once impounded or channeled can
be of no moment if it is diffused to a general flow at the point of entering adjoining
land." Id.
146. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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to constitute a violation, resulting in liability. Now, continuous flooding
caused by the alteration of the surface so as to eliminate absorption
and increase both the rate and quantity of the flow has been express-
ly approved. By limiting their inquiry to who is the upper owner and
by narrowing the reach of the collection and discharge modification,
the law is reduced to "might makes right.""' The Argyelan decision
reveals the fact that the common enemy rule has outlived its
usefulness and no longer comports with the realities of modern
society. '49 This fact has been recognized by other courts in Indiana. 1 0
The Indiana courts continue to apply the common enemy doc-
trine to surface water disputes, but its continued application is not
without opposition. 5 ' The appellate court in the third district has
expressed its dissatisfaction with the common enemy doctrine,'52 and
advocates adoption of the rule of reasonable use. The appellate court
of the first district reluctantly applied the common enemy rule to an
ongoing surface water dispute in a residential area.' Apparently, two
districts believe equity demands departure from stare decisis. If equity
demands departure from the common law, then the law should be
changed. Several states, other than Indiana, have made this deter-
mination. A survey of geographically similarly situated states indicates
148. Citing from Hunter's dissent, Argyelan, - Ind. at __, 435 N.E.2d at
978. Hunter states that "the race belongs to the person who is last in time, elevates
his land the highest and paves the greater portion of his lot surface." Id.
149. Weaknesses of the common enemy rule certainly outnumber its strengths.
The common enemy rule does resort to "might makes right." Application of the rule
prohibits a decision based upon all relevant issues. If the collection and discharge
modification is not violated, the injury is labeled "incidental" and relief is denied. The
determination of ultimate liability is based upon semantics. The upper owner is given
the advantage, and the lower owner is protected by only the right to dam, which
is not feasible in a majority of cases. A private owner is likely to pay for another's
commercial gain, and the law encourages developers to forego any attempt to predict
and prepare for possible drainage problems. Indiana has, in fact, legalized a very harmful
nuisance.
150. See supra notes 136, 144 and infra note 199 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. Note also that two of the five
justices on the Indiana Supreme Court advocate abandoning the common enemy rule.
152. The court in Rounds adopted the rule of reasonable use with only one
justice dissenting.
153. Kramer v. Rager, __ Ind. App .... 441 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1982).
The majority applied the common enemy rule but noted that the record in that case
revealed a continuing dispute among the landowners over drainage of surface water.
Citing Justice Hunter's dissent in Argyelan with approval, the court stated that the
very problem in Kramer was cited by Hunter as a major criticism of the common
enemy doctrine. The problem is one arising from attempts to either drain water on
adjacent property or to prevent drainage and cause water to pool.
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a movement away from strict adherence to either the common enemy
rule or the civil law rule."M After an evaluation of issues similar to
those which the Indiana Supreme Court failed to address in Argyelan,
courts in neighboring states have opted to modify or totally reject
archaic application of surface water principles.
SURVEY OF SURFACE WATER LAW IN NEIGHBORING STATES
States similarly situated as Indiana have also been confronted
with the surface water dilemma. A brief examination of their present
status in regard to surface water laws is helpful in determining the
viability of alternatives available to Indiana. The states selected for
analysis were chosen merely because of their proximity to Indiana.
Analysis of the law in Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin is
representative of the manner in which other jurisdictions have chosen
to deal with surface water laws.
Surface Water Law in Illinois
Generally, Illinois adopts a modified version of the civil law rule.1
Unlike Indiana, the early case law supports the principle that if a
person does a lawful act which damages the property of another, the
party causing the damage is liable to make reparation commensurate
to the injury.'- The supreme court in Illinois chose to reject the com-
mon enemy rule because it ignored the maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum
non laedus.1' The Illinois judiciary regards this maxim as the very
foundation of good morals and as necessary to the preservation of
peace."
In Illinois the farmer played the primary role in the develop-
ment of surface water law, which explains the wording adopted by
the courts in their good husbandry modification to the civil law rule.'59
Pursuant to the good husbandry modification, the owner of the domi-
nant (upper) estate does not have an unlimited right to increase the
rate or amount of surface water runoff flowing onto the servient
(lower) estate. The interference with natural drainage is limited to
that which is incidental to the reasonable development of the domi-
nant estate for agricultural purpose."6 Therefore, though the servient
154. See infra notes 155, 177, 185 and accompanying texts.
155. Templeton v. Huss, 57 Ill. 2d 134, 138, 311 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1974).
156. Stout v. McAdams, 3 Ill. 67, 69 (1839).
157. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
158. Gillham v. Madison County R. R. Co., 49 Ill. 484, 485-86 (1869).
159. Lindberg v. Lemenager, 73 Il. App. 3d 623, 392 N.E.2d 382 (1979).
160. Callahan v. Rickey, 93 Ill. App. 3d 916, 418 N.E.2d 167 (1981).
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estate must accept water "cast" upon it from the dominant estate,
the dominant estate cannot (1) increase the flow of water onto the
servient lands, (2) interfere with rights of surface water drainage, or
(3) collect water in an artificial channel and cast it upon the servient
estate.''
Illinois has not been confronted with the problem of the domi-
nant estate substantially altering its surface so as to interfere with
drainage through obstruction of natural seepage. The court in dicta
has stated however, that "the same principle that prevents
unreasonable changes in natural lateral drainage flow should also apply
to interferences with drainage through natural seepage."'0 2 The deter-
mining factor, whether the increased flow be caused by diversion from
another water shed, paving of streets, or construction of houses, is
whether the act is within the policy of reasonableness which initially
led to the good husbandry exception."6
Illinois provides additional protection for its residents against
harsh results in surface water disputes. Though good husbandry was
cited as a controlling factor under Indiana law,' 4 the two states ap-
proach the issue differently. First, Illinois provides greater protec-
tion by permitting the lower courts to determine the reasonableness
of certain questionable conduct. Secondly, Illinois permits recovery
when the lawful act results in injury. Finally, there are more restric-
tions placed upon the upper landowner in Illinois than are present
in Indiana. Had Argyelan been tried in an Illinois court, it is obvious
the outcome would be substantially different.
Michigan's Answer to Surface Water Disputes
Like Illinois, Michigan law provides that one owning property
higher in elevation has a right to discharge drainage water onto the
lower lying land." There are however limitations placed on the actions
of the dominant owner. These limitations are a mixture of the good
faith modification to the civil law rule and the collection and discharge
modification to the civil law rule.' 6 An upper landowner is liable for
161. Drainage Dist. No. 1, Sand Prairie Township, County of Tazewell v. Village
of Green Valley, 69 Ill. App. 3d 330, 387 N.E.2d 422 (1979).
162. Templeton, 57 Ill. 2d at 139, 311 N.E.2d at 145.
163. Id. at 139, 311 N.E.2d at 146.
164. Gene B. Glick, 165 Ind. App. at 77, 331 N.E.2d at 31.
165. Emerald Valley Land Dev. Co. v. Diefenthaler, 35 Mich. App. 346, 347,
192 N.W.2d 673, 674 (1971).
166. The "good faith" modification may be compared to the "due care" modifica-
tion to the common enemy rule. See supra note 48.
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intentionally grading and building downspouts which cause waters to
flow in excess of the natural flowage and which formerly were ab-
sorbed on their own premises, if such water is channeled and concen-
trated onto the adjoining property."7 The good faith modification was
set forth in a case involving land development where the court stated
that the upper owner has the right to fill holes and avoid accumula-
tion of water in the course of good faith improvement of his land.'
The owner of the dominant estate has no right, however, to cast ad-
ditional waters onto the servient estate in such a way as to cause
damage.'69 Eight years later, the court qualified this statement by
adding that the owner of the dominant estate may not, by changing
conditions on his land, put a heavier burden on the servient estate
by increasing and concentrating the volume and velocity of surface
water drainage.'70
Analysis of both Michigan and Illinois case law is helpful in
understanding the apparent confusion in Indiana as to which rule is
actually being applied. The Indiana appellate court in Rounds stated
that Indiana is applying both the common enemy and civil law rule
to surface water disputes.' The court's analysis in Rounds is valid
because Indiana subjects the upper owner to the collection and
discharge modification, similar to those state utilizing the civil law
rule. Yet, Indiana allows the lower owner to dam, which is permitted
neither in Illinois nor Michigan. In theory, it seems that the lower
owner is provided with more protection under Indiana law. But in
fact, the lower owner is punished if he is unable to dam and liability
is denied based upon a theory similar to contributory negligence.'72
Because the lower owner is permitted to dam, and thereby "fight"
surface water, the upper owner's right to divert surface water is not
strictly limited. The lower owner ultimately loses because often
damming is prohibited by economic deficiency or is prohibited because
of the lay of the land. Indiana case law permits developers to alter
167. Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 360 Mich. 214, 216, 103 N.W.2d 491, 493 (1960).
168. Emerald Valley, 35 Mich. App. at 347, 192 N.W.2d at 674.
169. Id. at 348, 192 N.W.2d at 674.
170. Lewallen v. City of Niles, 86 Mich. App. 332, 336, 272 N.W.2d 350, 352 (1979).
171. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
172. The language of the court in Weis v. City of Madison, 75 Ind. 241, 257
(1881) resembles the language of contributary negligence. There it was held that a
municipality could bring its streets up to grade thereby flooding those lots below street
level. The court continued by stating that the flooding of the lower lot would not
have occurred had the lot been raised. Therefore, the lower owner was "punished"
for not avoiding the flood water and in the end the theory of "might makes right"
was applied.
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the condition of the land so as to place a greater burden on the ser-
vient estate by increasing the volume and velocity of surface water
drainage."' Michigan and Illinois, on the other hand, limit the rights
of the upper owner when such alterations will affect lateral drainage
or drainage by natural seepage.
Surface Water Law in Ohio
Through the years Ohio has utilized each of the three rules
without stubborn adherence to any one rule and with the best in-
terests of its citizens in mind. Initially, the state of Ohio adopted the
civil law rule to govern its surface water disputes.17 ' As urbanization
increased, the courts retained the use of the civil law rule for rural
areas and adopted the reasonable use modification to the common
enemy doctrine for urban lots.' This modification, as applied in Ohio,
allowed a lower owner to divert the natural flow of surface water
by raising his land so long as he proceeded in a reasonable manner.'78
Eventually, the Ohio Supreme Court approved the limited application
of the rule of reasonable use, as set out in the Restatement of Torts,
to surface water disputes arising in an urban setting. "' Four years
thereafter, the court acknowledged the confused state of surface water
law in Ohio'78 and chose to abandon the reasonable use modification
173. The court in Glick, 165 Ind. App. at 77, 331 N.E.2d at 31, acknowledges
that there is a marked increase in the rate of runoff for any plat of land when hard
surfaces are placed thereon. Therefore, paving increases both the rate and quantity
of surface water runoff. The courts in Glick and Argyelan clearly condone such ex-
treme alterations of the surface of one's property without subsequent liability.
174. The civil law rule was first enunciated in Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio 334,
342-43 (1865).
175. Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953).
176. Id. Note that the civil law rule was applied prior to the adoption of the
modified version of the common enemy doctrine. Pursuant to the civil law rule, the
lower owner had to accept the drainage of surface water and could not elevate his
land to divert its natural flow.
177. Chudinsky v. City of Sylvania, 53 Ohio App. 2d 151, 155, 372 N.E.2d 611,
615-16 (1976). The court stated that:
The reasonable use rule and the rule codified in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
concerning non-trespassing invasions of a person's interest in the use and
enjoyment of his land resulting from another's interference with the flow
of surface water should be applied in determining whether a municipality
and private property owner are liable in damages for their actions which
caused increase and acceleration in flow of surface waters beyond capacity
of a natural watercourse.
Id.
178. The court stated that the present state of surface water law in Ohio is
decidedly unclear, as it is in several other states. The court went further to state
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to the common enemy rule for the more flexible rule of reasonable
use. 7' Therefore, Ohio presently applies the rule of reasonable use
to all surface water disputes and no longer limits its application to
disputes arising in an urban setting.
The rationale used by the Ohio court included several signifi-
cant issues which the Indiana Supreme Court failed to address in
Argyelan. The Ohio court acknowledged the recent trend to abandon
the common enemy doctrine because it no longer comports with the
realities of a modern society.' Use of tort concepts, as distinguished
from property concepts, allows for a clearer determination of whether
liability for damage resulting from an interference with surface water
should be borne by the one causing it. The court specifically stated
that there is no reason why the economic cost incident to the diver-
sion of surface water in the development of property should be borne
by adjoining landowners rather than by those who engage in such
projects for profit.'' The court reasoned that as the upper court is
in a position to avoid the harm threatened to the servient estate and
may do so at relatively small expense, it is only reasonable that the
offending owner bear that burden.' Therefore, unlike Indiana, Ohio
chose the more flexible tort concepts over the rigid, but predictable,
property law concepts.
Wisconsin Water Law
Wisconsin, like Ohio, has also chosen flexible tort law over
adherence to the common enemy rule. Recently the Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted the rule of reasonable use." Confronted with
a particularly inequitable situation," the court noted that only the
that several states experience difficulty in applying inflexible rules to various cir-
cumstances. McGloshan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Dev. Corp., 62 Ohio St.
2d 55, 58, 402 N.E.2d 1196, 1199, (1980).
179. It appears from McGloshan that the court will now apply the rule of
reasonable use both in rural and urban settings, as the court said: "Since we believe
such an analysis is more likely to provide both flexibility and certainty than any other
property based doctrines, this court therefore adopts a reasonable use rule to be used
in resolving surface water controversies." Id.
180. Chudinsky, 53 Ohio App. 2d at 155, 372 N.E.2d at 615.
181. Myotte v. Village of Mayfield, 54 Ohio App. 2d 97, 100, 375 N.E.2d 816,
819 (1977).
182. Id.
183. State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
184. The facts in Deetz are as follows: the defendants purchased property upon
a bluff overlooking Lake Wisconsin, upon which they began development of a residen-
tial subdivision. Prior to development the bluff was used for pasture and because of
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common enemy rule stood in the way of the state's efforts to secure
an injunction against further damage to one of the state's natural
resources." The court condemned the draconian application of the com-
mon enemy rule in the past," deciding to over-rule the doctrine as
it had outlived its usefulness. The Wisconsin courts thus adopted the
rule of reasonable use and the Restatement of Torts to govern all
future surface water disputes. As the adoption of the rule is prospec-
tive only, the court was forced to apply the common enemy doctrine
to a dispute arising prior to the adoption of the reasonable use rule.'87
Application of the common enemy doctrine in that dispute mandated
a finding of no liability, and the court expressed no great enthusiasm
for enforcing the inequitable result dictated by the archaic law.'88
Wisconsin prompted by the many inequities which accompany
application of the common enemy rule, chose to discard it for a more
flexible rule. Therefore, as "the attitudes of men shape the attitudes
of judges,"'89 the Wisconsin judiciary acted in the best interest of its
residents by abandoning the common enemy rule. This brief examina-
tion of Wisconsin's surface water law, and the laws of Indiana's other
neighboring states, emphasizes the need for Indiana to modify its com-
mon law and offers an example to Indiana of the alternatives available.
VIABLE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CHANGE THE
STATUS OF INDIANA SURFACE WATER LAW
Correctly understood and judicially applied, the law should pro-
tect a property owner's right to the reasonable use and enjoyment
of his property.'9 The prevailing surface water law in Indiana does
not provide this protection to its residents. There are several
alternatives'9' to remedy the situation presently facing Indiana pro-
natural seepage, no surface water ran down the bluff. As soon as development began,
erosion and runoff increased to the point of destroying the navigability of the lake
due to the formation of sand deltas. Application of the common enemy doctrine legalized
the destruction of the land and lake below by the "man at the top of the hill." Id.
at 4-5, 224 N.W.2d at 410-11.
185. Id. at 5, 224 N.W.2d at 411.
186. Ironically, the court in Deetz condemned the past application of the com-
mon enemy rule in a situation very much like Argyelanr. Id. at 6, 224, N.W.2d at 412.
187. Getka v. Lader, 71 Wis. 2d 237, 238 N.W.2d 87 (1976).
188. Id. at 242, 238 N.W.2d at 92.
189. Shaffer, supra note 30, at 75.
190. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 2, at 907.
191. Alternatives available include but are not limited to the following: (1) adop-
tion of the rule of reasonable use, see infra notes 203-205 and accompanying text; (2)
utilization of nuisance law, see infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text; (3) adopt
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perty owners, although only three of these appear to provide the
measure of protection Indiana residents deserve. Each alternative of-
fers a solution to the inequitable situations arising from the continued
application of the common enemy doctrine in its present form. A
change or modification of Indiana common law needs to be effected
immediately. Perhaps the most convenient change, though not the most
effective, would be the adoption of a reasonable use modification to
the common enemy doctrine.
Modification of Prevailing Surface Water Law
Currently, Indiana residents have the right to fight surface water.
The upper owner may divert the natural flow of surface water and
the lower owner may dam against the water draining onto his pro-
perty. The right to fight is limited only by the collection and discharge
modification. This modification forbids the upper owner to collect water
in a body and cast it onto a lower lot, but it fails to adequately pro-
tect the rights of Indiana's property owners. Adoption of the
reasonable use modification to the common enemy doctrine will pro-
vide added protection against inequitable results in surface water
disputes. Modifying the common enemy doctrine with a reasonable
use modification will impose liability upon a landowner who maliciously
or negligently diverts the flow of surface water to the detriment of
an adjoining landowner." Adoption of both the collection and discharge
modification and the reasonable use modification will place limitations
on the actions of the upper owner and the lower owner. The upper
owner may always drain surface water from his land except that he
may never collect it in a channel and cast it onto the adjoining land.'93
The lower owner may always obstruct the flow of water onto his land,
as long as he acts reasonably.9 ' Adoption of the reasonable use
modification will offer Indiana's property owner more protection than
is currently being provided under the common enemy rule. It is
the reasonable use modification to the common enemy doctrine, see infra notes 192-95
and accompanying text; (4) adopt a reasonable use modification to the civil law rule,
see supra notes 23-27, 48 and accompanying text; (5) parol license, requiring a license
or contract before diversion of surface water is permitted is a viable alternative under
certain circumstances. In that case valuable consideration is given for the right to
drain surface water onto another's property. See generally Ferguson v. Spencer, 127
Ind. 66, 25 N.E. 1035 (1890); (6) trespass, a physical invasion of one's property by
wrongfully diverted surface waters could result in a trespass. See generally Connor,
126 Ind. 85, 25 N.E. 876.
192. Myotte, 54 Ohio App. 2d at 99, 375 N.E.2d at 818.
193. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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debatable, however, whether adoption of this modification will offer
sufficient protection.
The reasonable use modification to the common enemy rule is
a solution to surface water disputes in urban areas.195 Nevertheless,
adoption of this modification also has its drawbacks: absent negligence
or malice, the common enemy rule is automatically invoked.'98
Therefore, it is quite possible that in some cases the court will be
forced to strictly apply the common enemy doctrine, despite an ine-
quitable outcome. Furthermore, such a modification would afford more
protection to the upper owner than the lower, but it is the latter
who is most likely to be injured and thus deserves protection. The
upper owner is allowed to divert surface water if he does so
reasonably, and the lower owner is allowed to dam against that sur-
face water if he does so in a non-negligent manner. Unfortunately,
this does not benefit a lower owner who is not able to dam. This fact
coupled with the conduct of developers already found by the courts
to be reasonable, 9 ' strip this alternative of its potential effectiveness.
Treatment of Surface Water as a Nuisance
Application of nuisance law to surface water disputes is another
alternative to the common enemy doctrine. The present law in In-
diana legalizes the diversion of surface water except as limited by
the collection and discharge modification. Because it is not a nuisance
to do that which the law authorizes, 98 rarely will a cause of action
be supported on a theory of nuisance." There exists, however, a
nuisance statute which could easily apply to surface water disputes.
195. Note, Flooding in Urban Areas, supra note 49.
196. Butler, 115 R.I. at 270, 341 A.2d at 740.
197. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
198. City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 327 (1885).
199. The court did find a nuisance when a violation of the collection discharge
modification occurred in Patoka Twp. v. Hopkins, 131 Ind. 142, 30 N.E. 896 (1892);
and Reed v. Cheney, 111 Ind. 387, 12 N.E. 717 (1887). In Smith v. Atkinson, 133 Ind.
App. 430, 180 N.E.2d 542 (1962), the court considered as a "well reasoned brief' one
based upon the theory that a landowner could alter the natural condition of his land
so as to concentrate and increase the discharge of surface water by artificial means
onto adjoining property and thereby create a nuisance. There was not, however, enough
evidence to uphold a theory of nuisance based on the increase in the flow of surface
water. Since that time, the court in both Glick and Argyelan have allowed rather severe
alterations in the natural condition of a property's surface without finding a nuisance
or liability. The court in Argyelan, as is pointed out by the dissent in Gilmer, refused
to address the potential application of the nuisance statute as providing a theory upon
which to affirm the trial court's finding. See supra note 137.
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The nuisance statute states that "whatever is injurious to health, or
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use
of property, so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. 200
Consequently, if it were not for the judicially created common enemy
rule, many surface water disputes could be governed by this nuisance
statute." ' Surface water, considered a "nuisance" under the common
enemy rule, is ironically excluded from the purview of nuisance law. 2
Inclusion of surface water law within the ambit of the nuisance statute
would allow a cause of action in those instances where the common
enemy doctrine provides none.
Rule of Reasonable Use
The most obvious, and certainly the most effective choice
available to the courts for protection of a property owner is the adop-
tion of the rule of reasonable use. The rule of reasonable use permits
a case by case analysis according to what is just and reasonable under
the circumstances. Application of this rule protects the rights of both
the upper and lower owner to reasonable use and enjoyment of their
property. Each owner is able to dispose of unwanted surface water
subject to the principle "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."0 3
Application of the rule of reasonable use is simplified by con-
secutive incorporation of specific sections of the Restatement of
Torts. 0 ' Adoption of the principles set forth in the Restatement in-
jects predictability in the application of the reasonable use rule. Stan-
dards used to judge the reasonableness of certain conduct are clearly
200. IND. CODE ANN. S 34-1-52-1 (West 1979).
201. In Gilmer the dissent notes that the court in Argyelan authorized a lan-
downer to alter his property in a manner which causes surface water to stand in
"unusual quantities" upon adjacent property. The dissent goes on to reason that this
leaves the trial court facing two conflicting rules, one of legislative origin (nuisance
law) and one of judicial origin (common enemy rule). Gilmer __ Ind. at __, 439
N.E.2d at 1358.
202. In Butler, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1956); Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 1183, 1190,
n.6, the court recognizes that the invasion of one's property by surface water can
be a nuisance, no different from an invasion by noise, noxious vapor, or the like. In-
diana has acknowledged that injury to health or senses is not the sole basis of the
nuisance statute. Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. O'Neille, 163 Ind. App. 466, 324 N.E.2d
846 (1975).
203. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
Comment, Discharge Injurious to Neighbor, supra note 34, at 284.
204. Most states which adopt the rule of reasonable use adopt RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS (SECOND) S 822-33.
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set forth in the Restatement. Upon its initial adoption, the rule may
provide little predictability as to the outcome in a particular instance.
Over time, however, the rule will afford both the flexibility and predic-
tability necessary for proper resolution of surface water disputes.
Predictability can be acquired by either legislative enactment or as
a result of a series of judicial decisions" while flexibility is inherent
in the rule itself. The rule of reasonable use permits a just balancing
of the competing interests of property owners. Therefore, both com-
mon well-being and social progress are better served by utilization
of the rule of reasonable use. Though three viable alternatives exist
which would improve the present status of Indiana surface water law,
neither the judicial branch nor the legislative branch have taken the
initial step to promote change.
An acknowledged function of both the judiciary and the
legislature includes the power to abrogate or modify common law
rights and remedies.' Therefore, either branch is capable of initiating
the adoption of a viable alternative to continued application of the
common enemy rule in Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court recently
declined to adopt any of the three alternatives discussed previously,
though an opportunity existed for such modification."° In fact, the
judicial branch has suggested that if a change is to occur, it must
be initiated by the legislative branch." Regardless of which branch
provides the impetus for change in Indiana surface water law, the
time for such change is now.
CONCLUSION
Diverting surface water is a necessity in a developing society.
Damages inevitably arise, however, when surface water is diverted
from the land of one property owner onto the land of another. The
manner in which damages will be assessed and liability ascertained
depends primarily upon the surface water law applied. Analysis of
205. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) S 826, comment d, 243. For example, predic-
tability may be enhanced by establishing a rule of law stating that certain types of
interference with residential use of land in a residential neighborhood constitute an
unreasonable invasion when the interference is caused by a business enterprise.
206. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., __ Ind. -,. 418 N.E.2d 207, 213
(1980); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., __ Ind. App. 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1066
(1980).
207. See supra notes 136, 144, 199 and accompanying text.
208. See generally Rounds __ Ind. App. at - 428 N.E.2d at 1318; Argyelan,
n__ Id. at _ 435 N.E.2d at 977; in which those justices adverse to change, state
that it is for the legislature to establish procedures for change and that the courts
cannot be a barometer for public opinion.
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the three basic doctrines governing surface water disputes, the com-
mon enemy rule, the civil law rule and the rule of reasonable use,
reveals that each rule has its own strengths and weaknesses. It is
alleged by several commentators that, despite the strengths inherent
in both the civil law and common enemy doctrines, the rule of
reasonable use is most adoptable to a modern society. The reasonable
use rule is favored because all relevant factors involved in surface
water disputes are considered by the courts, thereby minimizing the
probability of an exceptionally inequitable judgment.
Indiana decided to utilize the common enemy doctrine in surface
water disputes as early as 1878. Therefore, Indiana residents have
the "right to fight" surface water by using any available means, limited
only by the fact that an upper owner may not collect water in a body
and cast it onto the property below. This single modification does not
adequately protect Indiana residents from inequitable judgments aris-
ing from strict application of the common enemy doctrine. Foregoing
a timely opportunity to adopt the rule of reasonable use as the law
governing surface water disputes in Indiana, the supreme court recent-
ly elected to continue utilization of the common enemy doctrine. This
decision was made in spite of the fact that application of the common
enemy rule frequently mandates unjust results. The Indiana Supreme
Court has chosen to ignore the trend in surrounding states to aban-
don rigid property concepts for a more flexible approach to drainage
problems arising from modern land development. This rigid adherence
by the judiciary to archaic principles of surface water law is a signal
for the legislature to initiate change. Therefore, the legislative branch
should select an alternative approach to surface water disputes. It
is in the best interest of Indiana residents that the alternative selected
be the rule of reasonable use.
GWENN R. RINKENBERGER
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